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In the Suprellle Court
OF THE

State of Utah
RUTH ELIZABETH HOLT CRAVEN, \
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
- vs -

Case No. 7446

KENNETH D. CRAVEN,
Defendant and
Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court of
Utah County ,Honorable William Stanley Dunford, Judge.
This is an appeal from the Fourth Judicial District
Court of the State of Utah, In and For Utah County, and
from the judgment entered on the 2 I st of September,
1949, and from the judgment of said District Court' Judge,
the Honorable William Stanley Dunford, in denying the
appellant's motion for a new trial.
The Appellant will be referred to as defendant and
the Respondent will be referred to as the plaintiff.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant, Kenneth D. Craven, is a marr'ied man residing in Provo, Utah.
Plaintiff, the former wife of defendant, together with
Robert Holt Craven, a minor son of plaintiff and defendant, resides in Salt Lake City, Utah.
On or about the I Oth day of June, 1949, the plaintiff caused to be filed 'in the Fourth Judicial District
Court a petition entitled "Motion for Order to Show
Cause" which, omitting the formal portions thereof and
the prayer, reads as follows:
I. That on the 16th day of April, 1945, the Court
made and entered its decree in the above entitled
action wherein plaintiff was granted a divorce from
the defendant and was likewise given the care, custody and control of the minor child, Robert Holt
Craven, and whereby the defendant was ordered to
pay for the care, maintenance and support of said
child the sum of $25.00 per month, to commence on
the Ist day of May, 1945.

2. That at the same time the above-entitled decree was issued the aforesaid minor child was an infant of the age of fifteen months, and that at the
present time the minor child is of the age of 5 years
and 4 months.
3. That this plaintiff has no funds with which to support the said infant at this time and is wholly de-
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pendent upon the moneys paid by the defendant for
. the support of said infant.

4. That the said defendant is an architect with a
place of business at Provo, Utah, is gainfully employed, and the owner and in possession of various
real property, automobiles, cash and other personal
property, the exact value and location of which is
unknown to the plaintiff, but which is known to the
defendant herein.
5. That since the aforesaid decree of divorce was
issued, the child of the parties has grown from infancy to the age of five years and four months, with
the resuli that he requires much more food, clothing
and medical care; furthermore, that since the date
of the aforesaid decree there has been a great increase in the price of ·food, clothing, housing accomodations and all other items which are necessary
for the proper care and support of said infant.
6. That in consequence thereof, the $25.00 a month
paid by the defendant to the plaintiff for the support of said m·inor child is no longer adequate for
the support of said minor child, but that the plaintiff
herein is required to expend the sum of $50.00 per
month for the support of said child; that said sum is
necessary for the proper support, nutrition and care
of said child.
· 7. That the plaintiff herein has found it necessary
to engage the services of an attorney to petition
this Court to modify the original decree herein; that
the plaintiff herein is entitled to reimbursement by
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the defendant for the attorney fee incurred herein;
that the plaintiff is obligated to her attorney for a
reasonable attorney fee for his services herein.
The matter came on to be heard before the court
on the 27th day of August, 1949. The defendant was
present and was represented by counsel, but filed no
formal pleadings. However, counsel for the defendant,
at the opening of plaintiff's evidence, demurred to the
plaintiff's petition on the ground that the petition did
not allege facts sufficient to warrant a modification of the
decree (TR-3). The court overruled defendant's demurrer (TR-7).
At the conclusion of the hearing the defendant
moved the court to dism.iss the petition on the ground and
for the reason that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff did not prove facts sufficient to warrant a modification of the original decree. Said motion was denied by
the court.
Thereafter on the 21st day of September, 1949, the
court made and entered its Finding of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order of Modification which, omitting the
formal parts, are as follows:
FINDING OF FACT
I. That on the 16th day of April, 1945, the court
made and entered its decree in the above-entitled
action wherein plaintiff was granted a divorce from
the defendant, was likewise given the care, custody
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and control of the minor child, Robert Holt Craven,
and whereby the defendant was ordered to pay for
the care, maintenance and support of said child the
sum of $25.00 per month, to commence on the I st
day of May, 1945.
2. That at the time the above-mentioned decree
was issued the aforesaid minor child was an infant of
the age of fifteen months, and that at the present
time the minor child is of the age of 5years and 8
months.
3. That this plaintiff has no funds with which to
support the said infant at this time and is wholly dependant upon the moneys paid by the defendant for
the support of the said 'infant.
4. That the conditions under which the court based
its original decree and the amount of payment of
money for the support of the said minor child have
changed in the following particulars:
A. The defendant is now employed as an
estimator and draftsman in architectural work and is
earning a substantial income.

B. The minor child of the parties is now five
years and eight months old and is about to enter
school; and
C. The necessities of the child for clothing,
food, education and care have materially increased
in cost, due both to the growth of the child and to
a general increase of prices of such items.
5.

That there is needed for the care and support of
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the child at present the sum of $35.00 per month
until the child actually enters school and $50.00 per
month after the said child enters school.
6. That the plaintiff herein has found it necessary
to engage the services of an attorney to petition this
court to modify the original decree herein; that the
plaintiff herein is entitled to reimbursement by the
defendant for the attorney fee incurred herein; that
a reasonable fee for the hearings had herein and
services performed in connection herewith is $100.00:
that plaintiff is obligated to her attorney in the
amount of $1 00.00 for the services herein.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

As conclusions of law from the foregoing findings of
fact, the court concludes:
I.
That the plaintiff is entitled to an order of this
court modifying the original decree herein so as to
provide that the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff
as support money for the minor child of the parties
the sum of $35.00 per month until such time as the
said child enters school and $50.00 per month thereafter and until further order of this court.

2. That the plaintiff 'is entitled to an order of this
court directing the defendant to pay to her the sum
of $100.00 for attorney's fees in this action.
3. That the plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed by
the defendant for her costs in this action.
ORDER OF MODIFICATION

NOW, THEREFORE by reason of the Findings of
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Fact and Conclusions of law aforesaid, it is hereby
ordered, adjudged and decreed:
I. That the original decree herein be modified so
as to provide that the defendant be ordered to pay,
and is hereby ordered to pay to the plaintiff for the
support of the minor child of the parties the sum of
$35.00 per month until such times as the said child
enters school. and thereupon and thereafter the sum
of $50.00 per month until the further order of this
court.
2. The defendant is hereby ordered to the pay the
plaintiff the sum of $100.00 for her attorney's fees
in this action and her costs in this action in the
amount of $2 1.1 0; and that furthermore the said
costs and attorney's fees shall be paid within 30 days
from the date of the service upon the defendant of
this order.
On or about the 21st day of September, 1949, the
defendant filed his Notice of Motion for New Trial
(JR-37). The Motion for new trial was heard by the Honorable William Stanley Dunford and on the 27th day of
October, 1949, the court denied the mofion (JR-44).
Thereafter defendant filed and served his Notice of
Appeal (JR-.57), and perfected his appeal to the court.
The evidence adduced at the hear'ing shows that on
or about the 16th day of April. 1945, the plaintiff was
granted a divorce from the defendant and she was awarded the care, custody and control of Robert Holt Craven,
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m1nor son of the plaintiff and the defendant, and that
the defendant was orderd to pay the plaintiff, for the support and maintenance of said child the sum of $25.00
per month (JR-13).
At the time of the divorce the defendant was an independent contractor working out of his own home
(TR-28) and at the time of hearing of the Petition for Modification there had been no change in that respect (TR-29}.
When the divorce decree was entered the defendant
owned a home, and at the time of the hearing of the
Petition for Modification he owned the same property.
That was +he real property which was referred to in plaintiff's petition (TR-29) and there is no evidence that he
owns any other real property. At the time of the divorce the defendant owned an automobile, and at the
time of the Petition for Modification the defendant likewise had an automobile. (TR-81} At the time of the divorce the defendant was earning between $250.00 and
$300.00 per month and was banking the same in a checking account (TR-29), whereas, the evidence adduced ·at
the hearing on plaintiff's petition was that the defendant
had grossed approximately $1,700.00 from the first of
the calendar year 1949 down to the date of the hearing
of the Petition for Modification (TR-78). At the time of
the hearing the defendant had $78.07 on deposit in a
checking account and $144.27 in a savings account
(TR-1 0). The defendant did not own any property in
1949 that he did not own in 1945 except that he had
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traded cars and was obligated to pay $66.00 per month
on his new car (TR-81 ).
The defendant is frequently unemployed now and
the situation with respect to his employment is similar to
that of 1945, when the divorce was obtained (TR-87).
Robert Holt Craven, the minor son of the plaintiff and defendant, was fifteen months otd at the time the divorce
decree was entered and was five and one-half years old
at the time of the hearing of the Petition for Modification
(TR-14). The child wasn't of school age and w·asn't in
school at the time of the hearing and is not in school at
the present time.
I.

Witness Mrs. Craven did not have an independent
recollection of the 'items of food and clothing that might
have been purchased for the child in 1945 (TR-1 8). She
wquld not say that it did not cost $50.00 per month to
n;9intain the child in 1945 (TR-32). The plaintiff had been
p~yi!lg $30.00 per month for the child's food and shelter
since the divorce decree was entered and she anticipated
that the same arrangement would continue in the future
(TR-21 ). The plaintiff is employed and makes $208.00
per month (TR-36), and the plaintiff has been able to save
$60.00 per month from her earnings (TR-37).
l.

Witness Rex Taylor testified that in his opinion
clothing costs had increased somewhere between 20 per
cent and 30 per cent from 1945 to 1949 (TR-44). The witness could not give any evidence as to the difference in
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the cost of clothing for a fifteen month old boy in 1945
and the cost of clothing for a boy five years old in 1949.
(TR-52).
Witness Kenneth L. Pace testified that in his opinion
foods generally were 20 per cent higher in 1949 than in
1945 (TR-65). The witness's testimony was based on OPA
price ceiling schedule which became effective as of
March I, 1946, (TR-60).
The defendant had at all times made all payments
required of him under the original decree and at the time
of the petition for Modification was entirely current on
all payments due for the support and maintenance of the
minor child growing out of the original decree of divorce.

POINTS RELIED UPON FOR REVERSAL
J. Plaintiff's petition for modification did not contain facts suffici~nt to show a mater'ial change in circumstances warranting a modification of the decree and the
defendant's timely objection thereto was erroneously overruled by the trial court.
2. The evidence and proof adduced at the hearing
was insufficient to warrant a modification of the decree
and the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion
to dismiss the petition.
3. Finding of Fact numbered 3, to the effect that
plaintiff was entirely dependent upon defendant for the
support of the minor. child is without any factual basis·
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whatever and is clearly contrary to the evidence.

4.

Finding· of Fact numbered 4 (A) which states

that defendant was earning a substantial mcome is not
supported by any substantial evidence.

5.

The court erred in granting plaintiff a special

award to cover educational costs for the minor child.
6.

Finding of Fact numbered 4 (C) insofar as it im-

plies an increased burden on the part of the plaintiff by
reason of increases in the cost of food, education and care
:r

:e.

..

is without any substantial evidence and is contrary to the
evidence.

7.

Finding of Fact numbered 5 is not supported

by the evidence and is a Conclusion of Law.
8.

The court erred in granting plaintiff judgment

against the defendant for the sum of $1 00.00 for her
attorney.

ARGUMENT

The court erred in overruling defendant's demurrer to
the plaintiff's petition.
It is well settled in Utah that the power of the court
to modify a prior decree is limited to cases where a material change of conditions has occurred, Hamilton v.
Hamilton, 58 P {2) I I; Chaffee v. Chaffee, 225 P 76; Car-
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son v. Carson, 47 P (2) 894; and that a modification may

be had only upon allegation and proof of such material
change. Doe v. Doe, 158 P. 781; Gardner v. Gardner,
177 P (2) 743. An order modifying a decree will be reversed where the petition does not sufficiently allege a
material change of conditions. Jones v. Jones, 139 P

(2) 222.

I

,II
'

Plaintiff's petition shows nothing more by way of
changed condii·ions than that the minor child has aged
from 15 months to 5 years and four months and that there
has been some increase in the cost of food and clothing.
Such allegations, standing alone, lack the sign"ificance and
materiality essential to the modification of an existing
decree. That a child of tender years will grow and age
and prices will fluctuate are factors of which the court
must have been cognizant when the or'iginal decree was
entered.
The allowance of plaintiff's petition on such a slight
and insignificant basis would set a precedent likely to deprive original decrees of all semblence of stability and
force. See, Rockwood v. Rockwood (Utah) 236 Pac. 457,
and Snyder v. Snyder, (Cal.) 25 P (2) 403.

II
The court erred in failing and refusing to grant the
defendant's motion for a dismissal of the petition on the
ground that the evidence and proof was insuffient to warrant a modification of the decree.
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Defendant, of course, concedes that the allegations
contained in paragraph I and 2 of the plaintiff's petition
are true.
The allegation in paragraph 3 that the plaintiff had
no funds with which to support the child and was wholly
dependent upon the moneys paid by the defendant not
only was not supported by any evidence whatsoever, but
was contrary to the plaintiff's own testimony. Pla'intiff
testified that she was employed; that she was earn.ing
$208.00 per month, and that she made a practice of
saving $60.00 per month (TR-36-37).
With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of plaintiff's petition the evidence shows that the
defendant was not an architect but was an estimator and
draftsman working out of his own home on an independent contractor basis (TR-28), and that there had been no
change in that respect (TR-29). The evidence further
shows that at the time of the divorce the defendant usually earned between $250.00 and $300.00 per month
(TR-29). From the first of the calendar year 1949, down
7o the time of the hearing of the petition for modification the defendant had earned only about $I, 700.00,
(TR-78) an average of about $212.50 per month. At the
time of the hearing the defendant had only $78.07 in his
checking account and $144.27 in a savings account.
(TR-1 0). The defendant did not have enough work to
keep him busy (TR-78). He was frequently unemployed
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and the situation with respect to employment was similar
to what it had been in 1945, when the divorce was obtained (TR-87).
The defendant owned no real property in 1949 that
he had not owned in 1945, at the time of the divorce.
The ''various'' real property mentioned by the plaintiff in
her petition referred only to defendant's home (TR-29)
which he had also owned at the time of the divorce. At
the time of the divorce the defendant had owned an automobil (TR-29). At the time of this hearing he had acquired a different automobile, but had obligated himself
to a payment of $66.00 per month to pay for the same.
(TR-81).
Defendant submits that the plaintiff's petition failed
to allege any change in the defendant's financial circumctances and that plaintiff's evidence with respect thereto
not only failed to establish a change for the better. but
actually indicated that the defendant was, at the time of
the hearing, in a worse financial condition than when the
divorce was granted.
Insofar as the allegations in paragraph 5 of plaintiff's petition are concerned, the evidence indicates that
ever since the granting of the divorce decree in 1945,
the plaintiff and the child had resided in Salt Lake City
with plaintiff's parents, and plaintiff had been, and was
at the time of the hearing, paying her mother $30.00 per
month for the care, food and shelter for the child. Plain-

I,

'I

I

I
I

I

I
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tiff anticipated that the same cost would continue in the
future. (TR-21) In view of that arrangement the evidence with respect to the increase in food prices was immaterial and defendant's objection thereto on that ground
. should have been sustained.
The most that could be said for plaintiff's proof is
that there is some evidence that the general cost of clothing had increased somewhere between 20 per cent and 30
per cent from 1945 to 1949. Witness, Rex Taylor, however, could not correlate the difference in the cost of
clothing for a 15 month old child in 1945, as against the
cost of clothing for a 5 year old in 1949. Furthermore, if
it is true that clothing and food costs have generally 'increased, it must be asumed that the increase has affected
the defendant also. If he made substantially the same
money at the time of the hearing of the petition as he did
at the time of the divorce, his economic situation is adversely affected by increased prices.
Paragraph 6 of the petition is a mere conclusion.

Ill
The court erred in making and entering its Finding of
fact numbered 3, which reads as follows:
"That this plaintiff has no funds with which to support said infant at this time and is wholly dependent upon the moneys paid by defendant for the
support of said infant."
The only evidence relating to this assignment ot error
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is, that of the plaintiff herself. Plaintiff stated that she
was employed and that she was earning $208.00 per
month and that she made it a practice of saving $60.00
each month (TR-37). Defendant finds nothing whatsoever
to the contrary in the transcript.

IV
The court erred in making and entering its Finding
of Fact numbered 4 (A) which reads as follows:
"The defendant is now employed as an estimator
and draftsman in architectural work and is earning
a substant'ial income."
It is clear that the defendant is not an "employee" in
the usually accepted sense of the wor·d. He is, and at all
times herein material has been, an independent contractor
functioning out of his own home (TR-28-29). He did not
have enough business to keep him busy (TR-78). He is
often without any work to do. The situation in the respect is similar to what it was in 1945 (TR-87).
The evidence shows that the defendant has remarried and that his gross income for the year 1949, down to
the time of the hearing, was only about $1 ,700.00. Making no allowance whatever for his ordinary and necessary
business expenses, he grossed only about $212.50 on a
monthly average. He had entered into another marriage and had incurred an obligation on an automobile
to the extent of $66.00 per month. Those obligations,
coupled with the $25.00 per month due under the original
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decree, certainly left the defendant m short financial
circumstances to say the least.
There is no evidence whatever that the defendant
was "employed" or that he had a job of work to do at
the time of the hearing. No inquiry concerning his status
at that time was directed to him or to any other witness
at the hearing.

v
The court erred in granting the plaintiff a special increase to cover educational costs for the m·inor child.
Plaintiff's petition makes no mention whatever respecting the education of the child. The child was only
five years old and was not of school age. There is no
evidence whatever in the record of this case to indicate
that spec'ial educational costs wi!l be incurred or that if
and when the child becomes of school age it would be
necessary for it to attend other than a free public school.
The pleading will not support the order of the trial court.
Jones v. Jones (Utah} 139 P (2} 222.

VI
The court erred in finding that the cost of providing
food, education and care of the min-or child has placed
an increased burden on the plaintiff.
As has hereinbefore been pointed out, the plaintiff
testified that since the granting of the original decree she
had continuously paid her mother $30.00 per month for
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food, lodging and care of the child. She antic.ipated
that such arrangement would continue in the future
{TR-2 I).
That the price of groceries may have increased from
1945 to 1949, became an immaterial factor in this
case. Plaintiff for a number of years had expended
$30.00 per month to secure these items for the child.
That arrangement was operative at the time of the hearing and so far as the plaintiff could foresee would continue indefinitely.

VII
The court erred in ordering the defendant to increase his payments for the support of the minor child.
The defendant respectfully submits that the needs
of the child (assuming that the need has been shown) is
certainly not the sole criteria for the granting of an increase in the monthly allowance. Of necessity, the ability
of the father to pay ·is o,ne of the dominating factors.
The evidence indicates that the defendant was grossing about $212.50 per month. He was ·in business for
himself and although the record does not disclose the extent of his business expenses, it would have to be assumed
that his earnings were not all profit. He had rem9rried
:md had thus assumed an additional burden. He had obligated himself to the extent of $66.00 per month for the
purchase of a car. This latter obligation coupled with his
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expense of $25.00 per month for the support of the child
under the original decree, would leave him only approximately $121.50 per month for his business and living
expenses.
Although the father owes the primary duty to sup·
port the child, the mother likewise has a responsibility.
Where as in the instant case the mother's earning capacity substantially equals that of the father and the requirements of the child are beyond the reasonable means
of the father owing to his limited earning abil"ity and to
other prior obligations incurred by him, the mother should
be expected to contribute to the support of the child. In
such case the trial court is not justified in placing the entire responsibility upon an overburdened father. Cf:
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Woolf in Holbrook
v. Holbrook. No. 7296.

VIII
The court erred in granting plaintiff judgment
against defendant for the sum of $100.00 for her attorney.
It is conceded by the parties that at the time of the
hearing the defendant had made all payments required of
him by the original decree and was not in default thereunder in any manner whatsoever.
Where a defendant is not in default under the original decree, and the decree has become final so that his
former spouse is no longer his wife within the meaning of
the statute, attorney's fees are not allowable even though
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it may be said that the action is for the benefit of a minor
child.

Barish v. Barish, 180 N.W. 724, an Iowa case in-

volving a statute indentical to that of Utah.

Also see,

Duvall v. Duvall, 244 N.W. 718; Dolby v. Dolby, (Wash.)
160 P. 950: Hector v. Hector, (Wash.), 99 P. 13; Hayton
v. Hayton 21 I P. 745.
Defendant concedes that there are numerous Utah
cases involving a defendant in default where attorney's
fees have been allowed. A number of such cases are
referre'd to in the Honorable Trial Judge's memorandum
decision on motion for new trial. In all of those cases the
actions being tried grew out of the original decree and
were designed to either preserve or enforce the original
decree. Counsel for defendant could not find any Utah
case allowing attorney's fees against a defendant who was
not in default under the original decree.
The Honorable Trial Judge's rationale is based on the
equities as he saw them. But, the allowance of attorney's
fees is statutory and such fees may be granted only as
provided by law. There are many situations where the
allowance of. attorney's fees would apparently be ~quit
able, but the court is without authority to grant them.
Here the plaintiff is no longer the wife of the defendant.
This suit did not grow out of the original decree, but by
its very nature must be predicated upon changed conditions arising since that time. Furthermore, as far as the
equities are concerned the facts here would support a
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finding that the plaintiff was better able financially to
bear her attorney's fee than was the defendant.
The very nature of a situation such as the one at
hand impels a defendant to resist the petition for modification, if for no other reason than to ward off a judgment
against him for attorney's fees. He is not in default but
has complied in all respects with the order of the court.
Yet, without warning and without opportunity to voluntarily increase his payments, under the holding of the instant
case, a defendant may find himself under judgment for
attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the court should reverse
the trial court's decision in the above entitled cause.
Respectfully submitted,
ALDRICH & BULLOCK,

Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant.
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